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THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CRISIS:
COMPENSATING WORKERS FOR
INJURIES IN THE OFFICE
Rachel M. Janutis*
The legal system has historically afforded inferior remedies for
emotional injuries than it has for physical injuries. This bias against
psychological injuries is prevalent in the area of workers'
compensation, where most state statutes allow workers to receive
compensation for work-related physical injuries but not purely
emotional or mental injuries. This Article discusses and ultimately
argues that states should extend workers' compensation coverage to
emotional injuries. The argument for such an extension of workers'
compensation coverage is based on many factors, most notably the
prevalence of workplace stress and its effect on workers' health, well-
being, and productivity, as well as the inapplicability of the "physical
impact rule" in the context of workers' compensation claims for
psychological injuries.
The law frequently treats claims that seek compensation for
purely emotional distress or mental injuries differently than claims
that seek compensation for physical injuries. Indeed, the law
frequently demonstrates a seeming hostility toward compensation for
purely mental or emotional injuries.' In this Article, I highlight one
area where this hostility arises. A significant minority of states
continue to exclude from workers' compensation coverage claims for
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Capital University
Law School. The author wishes to thank Ellen Pellegrini, CULS '08, for her helpful research
assistance with this Article.
1. For example, all jurisdictions have long recognized claims for damages to compensate
for physical injuries arising out of another's negligence, and all states permit plaintiffs to recover
damages for "parasitic emotional distress"-emotional distress that results from negligently
inflicted bodily injury. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 363 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter "PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS"]; John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 789 (2007). However, claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress have only recently gained acceptance, with courts placing additional limits on recovery
for purely emotional distress.
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psychological injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment.
The treatment of compensation for mental injuries in this area is
particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, it highlights the
dissonance between the legal conception of the connection between
mental health and workplace productivity and the conception of this
connection in other social sciences. The hostile treatment of these
claims within the law discounts the role that mental health and
acumen play in the modem workplace. At the same time, a growing
body of social science research seeks to demonstrate and quantify the
impact of mental disorders on work productivity. This discord is
problematic when one considers the increasing prevalence of
workplace stress and injuries resulting from workplace stress.
Second, employer liability for workers' compensation claims is
significantly more limited than what liability for emotional distress
damages would be in traditional tort law claims. General
noneconomic damages such as those for pain and suffering are not
awarded through the workers' compensation system. Instead,
workers' compensation awards compensate for economic losses such
as lost wages and expenses for medical and rehabilitation treatment
only. Awards are only available upon a showing of partial or total
vocational impairment. Thus, claims for workers' compensation
benefits for purely emotional or mental injuries are not susceptible to
some of the usual concerns raised over such claims in other areas. In
this way, the law's continued hostility to these claims highlights the
public perceptions about and biases against these types of injuries.
In Part I, this Article will begin by giving a few illustrations of
the societal bias against mental injuries and the disparate treatment of
victims of such injury and illness. It will also explore various studies
on the prevalence of workplace stress, its effect on health and well-
being, and the costs of mental illness and disorders caused by
workplace stress. Part II will first give a quick overview of workers'
compensation, followed by a history of workers' compensation,
beginning with the common law system of freedom of contract and
the subsequent shift to risk allocation when strict liability replaced
the common law fault-based system. Finally, Part II will analyze the
different state requirements for affording coverage for psychological
injuries. Part III provides an analysis of the physical impact rule as a
design to limit the scope of claimants for whose injuries employers
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are liable, as well as a way to quash concerns about the ability to
fabricate mental injury claims. Finally, Part IV explores why states
have been reluctant to apply the risk allocation principle of workers'
compensation to psychological injuries.
I. Two PORTRAITS OF THE HAZARDS OF
WORKPLACE STRESS
Two contrasting accounts of the hazards of workplace stress
shed light on the potential hazards that office workers face and
public perceptions and biases about those hazards.
A. Safety Training in the Office
In one episode of the popular television comedy The Office, the
warehouse workers at the fictional Dunder Mifflin Paper Company
are required to attend a mandatory safety training conducted by
Darryl, one of the warehouse workers.2 Regional manager and boss
of the office, Michael Scott, decides to require office workers to
attend the training as well. During the safety training, Darryl
explains the perilous hazards of using the heavy machinery in the
warehouse improperly, noting the risk of serious physical injury.
After a confrontation between Darryl and Michael regarding the
proper way to avoid these serious injuries, Michael mandates that all
workers-office and warehouse-attend a mandatory office safety
training session. Hilarity ensues as Michael attempts to dramatize
the seemingly innocuous risks of office work, including repetitive
stress injuries and depression. At one point in the office training
session, Darryl orders the warehouse workers to walk out of the
office training and angrily accuses Michael of living a "nerfy" life
and always sitting on his "biscuit," instead of doing actual work.
Michael then attempts to dramatize the risk of depression by
threatening to jump off the office roof. Ultimately, Darryl heroically
saves the day by insincerely convincing Michael that he is a
"Braveheart" and that Darryl "could not do what you do."3 Such a
portrayal comports with popular notions about the relative risks and
health consequences of stress and mental illness as opposed to
physical labor and physical injury.
2. The Office: Safety Training (NBC television broadcast Apr. 12, 2007).
3. Id.
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B. McCrone v. Bank One Corp.4
In contrast, Kimberly McCrone's real-life exposure to health
risks from office employment paints a much different picture. On
August 4, 2001, Kimberly McCrone was working as a teller at a
Bank One branch in Canton, Ohio, when she was robbed at
gunpoint.5 After the robbery, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD") and was unable to return to the bank.6
After being diagnosed with PTSD, McCrone applied to receive
workers' compensation benefits. As Justice Resnick of the Ohio
Supreme Court would later observe, McCrone's "injury [was] real
and disabling, and its existence [was] supported by competent
medical evidence. It [was] work-related in every sense of the word,
it was accidental in character and result, and it has prevented
[McCrone] from returning to her former position of employment."7
Nonetheless, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation denied
McCrone's application for benefits because McCrone's injuries were
purely psychological, and the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act
excludes purely psychological or psychiatric injuries from the
definition of covered injuries.8 As Justice Pfeifer of the Ohio
Supreme Court noted, if McCrone had suffered so much as a paper
cut during the course of the robbery, she would have been entitled to
workers' compensation benefits for all of her injuries, including the
PTSD, because the Act provides coverage for all injuries-
psychological and physical-as long as an employee suffers a
physical injury.9
McCrone challenged the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act,
arguing that the exclusion of purely psychological injuries violated
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States
Constitutions. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately rejected her
claim." In so doing, the court noted that because her injuries were
not covered by the Act, McCrone was not precluded from pursuing a
4. 107 Ohio St. 3d 272, 2005 Ohio 6505, 839 N.E.2d 1.
5. Id. 2.
6. Id.
7. Id. 43 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
8. Id. 2 (majority opinion).
9. See id. 55 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
10. Id. 2 (majority opinion).
11. Id. 38.
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common law claim for damages against her employer.12 However, as
Justice Pfeifer also noted in his dissent, the availability of a common
law claim afforded McCrone only hollow protection. 3 McCrone's
claim for negligence against her employer likely would be precluded
under the intervening cause doctrine, and hence, McCrone was likely
to go without compensation for her injuries. 4
Countless other examples illustrate the societal biases against
mental injuries and illness and the disparate treatment of victims of
such injuries and illness. For example, recent news accounts have
highlighted the plight of returning Iraq war veterans seeking accurate
diagnosis and adequate treatment of their stress-related injuries such
as PTSD. 5 These societal prejudices against mental illness and
injury manifest themselves in the law's continued hostility to claims
seeking compensation for these types of injuries.
C. The Relationship Between Stress and
Workplace Productivity
Unfortunately, McCrone's experience more accurately reflects
realities about the prevalence of workplace stress and the effect that
workplace stress can have on health and well-being. Studies of
American workers reveal that stress is a reality of the American
workplace. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health ("NIOSH") has reported the results of several studies
pertaining to stress in the workplace. 6 Between 25 percent and 40
percent of the workers surveyed in these studies report feeling very
12. Id. 33 n.5.
13. See id. 53 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
14. See id.
15. For example, National Public Radio correspondent Daniel Zwerdling filed a series of
stories detailing allegations of discriminatory treatment against soldiers who sought treatment for
mental illness at one military base. See, e.g., Daniel Zwerdling, Military Wives Fight Army to
Help Husbands, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, May 16, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=90378222; Daniel Zwerdling, Soldiers Say Army Ignores, Punishes Mental
Anguish, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=6576505; see also Julian E. Barnes, Veterans Struggle with War Trauma, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A 16; William M. Welch, Trauma of Iraq War Haunting Thousands
Returning Home, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2005, at 1A (noting that six out of ten soldiers surveyed
reported concerns of discriminatory or hostile treatment if they acknowledged mental health
problems).
16. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, PUBLICATION NO. 99-101,
STRESS ... AT WORK [hereinafter STRESS... AT WORK].
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or extremely stressed at work.17 This same publication cites studies
reporting that one-quarter of employees view their jobs as the top
source of stress in their lives, that three-quarters of employees
believe that work is more stressful than it was a generation ago, and
that workers more strongly associate problems at work with health
complaints than they do with any other life stressor, including
financial problems and family problems. 8
Moreover, unlike the lighthearted portrayal of the consequences
of exposure to workplace stress portrayed in The Office episode
detailed above, NIOSH has recognized that exposure to workplace
stress has been linked to several types of physical ailments and
chronic health problems, including mood and sleep disturbances,
headaches, cardiovascular disease, and psychological disorders. 9
NIOSH cites studies finding that health care expenditures are nearly
50 percent greater for workers who report high levels of stress.2"
NIOSH notes that these health consequences translate into increased
rates of absenteeism, tardiness, and unemployment-all of which
contribute to decreased productivity."
More importantly, recent social science research has sought to
chronicle the effect of exposure to workplace stress on mental and
physical health. Additional social science research has sought to
quantify the cost of health consequences frequently linked to
workplace stress, including the cost to workplace productivity. For
example, work by Professor Michael Frese and other researchers has
concluded that workplace stress has a negative impact on mental and
physical health.2 Frese has concluded that a significant correlation
exists between psychological stress and psychosomatic complaints
that cannot be explained by study methodology or individual
variables such as income, age, or financial security.23
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Michael Frese, Stress at Work and Psychosomatic Complaints: A Causal Interpretation,
70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 314, 326-27 (1985); see also James S. House, Victor Strecher, Helen
Metzner & Cynthia A. Robbins, Occupational Stress and Health Among Men and Women in the
Tecumseh Community Health Study, 27 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 62 (1986); Debra J. Lerner,
Sol Levine, Sue Malspeis & Ralph B. D'Agostino, Job Strain and Health-Related Quality of Life
in a National Sample, 84 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1580 (1994).
23. Frese, supra note 22, at 326-27.
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Other research has quantified the costs of mental illness and
disorders frequently linked with exposure to workplace stress. For
example, one study estimated the annual cost of anxiety disorders
such as the PTSD that McCrone suffered to be $42.3 billion in 1990
in the United States alone. 4 The researchers concluded that $4.1
billion, or 10 percent of these costs, was attributable to indirect
workplace costs, including excess absenteeism and reductions in at-
work productivity.25 Another study concluded that the costs for
anxiety disorders in the United States in 1990 was $46.6 billion, with
over 75 percent of these costs attributable to lost or reduced
workplace productivity. 26 Another study estimated the annual lost-
productivity costs due to depression account for 55 percent of the
total costs associated with the depression.27 The study estimated the
costs of excess absenteeism from depression to be about $11.7
billion annually, while the costs of reductions in at-work productivity
were about $12.1 billion annually. 8 While not all anxiety disorders
and depression can be linked to workplace stress, the large costs
associated with anxiety disorders and depression suggest that even
that portion of these costs that can be linked to workplace stress
would be significant.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. An Overview of Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation is a statutorily created administrative
scheme designed to provide compensation to victims who suffer
injuries in the course of employment 9.2  A workers' compensation
system is designed to displace the common law tort system.3" Under
24. See Paul E. Greenberg, Tamar Sisitsky, Ronald C. Kessler, Stan N. Finkelstein, Ernst R.
Berndt, Jonathan R.T. Davidson, James C. Ballenger & Abby J. Fryer, The Economic Burden of
Anxiety Disorders in the 1990s, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 427, 427 (1999).
25. Id.
26. Robert L. DuPont, Dorothy P. Rice, Leonard S. Miller, Sarah S. Shiraki, Clayton R.
Rowland & Henrick J. Harwood, Economic Costs of Anxiety Disorders, 2 ANXIETY 167, 167
(1996).
27. See Paul E. Greenberg, Laura E. Stiglin, Stan N. Finkelstein & Ernst R. Berndt, The
Economic Burden of Depression in 1990, 54 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 405, 411 (1993).
28. Id. at 411.
29. See MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 1-2 (Oceana Publ'ns
1997).
30. Id. at 1.
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the typical workers' compensation system, injured workers receive
benefits intended to compensate the workers for lost wages and the
cost of medical treatment as a result of their injuries.3' Injured
workers become entitled to compensation whenever they suffer an
injury arising out of the course of their employment regardless of the
allocation of fault among employee, fellow workers, and employer
for the accident, and regardless of the absence of negligence on the
part of the employer in the accident.32 Benefits for certain types of
injuries are determined pursuant to a preset schedule33 and, for all
injuries, are usually more modest than the compensatory damages
that would be available under the common law tort system.3
However, administrative proceedings to recover benefits are more
relaxed than full-scale litigation and are designed to be speedier and
less expensive than litigation.35
Employers bear the cost of workers' compensation. Under most
state systems, employers are required to secure their potential
liability through private insurers or demonstrate adequate assurances
of self-coverage.36 Some states provide state-funded insurance
coverage.37 While employers become liable for benefits regardless of
fault, employers are protected from common law tort liability for
workplace accidents.3" Thus, workers' compensation represents a
quid pro quo exchange between employers and employees.
Employees receive the certainty of automatic benefits, while
employers receive smaller liability in the form of reduced benefits
and protection from common law liability.
A couple of limiting principles govern workers' compensation
schemes. First, employers are liable for injuries to employees only
31. Id. at 17-19.
32. See LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (Lex K. Larson ed., 2007); see
also JASPER, supra note 29, at 1-2.
33. JASPER, supra note 29, at 18.
34. See LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 1.03[5] (noting that
unlike the tort system, workers' compensation does not seek to restore to the injured party all that
she has lost, but instead awards a sum that, added to remaining earning capacity, enables the
injured party to exist without being a burden to others).
35. Id. § 1.01; JASPER, supra note 29, at 10.
36. JASPER, supra note 29, at 4; LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32,
§ 1.01.
37. JASPER, supra note 29, at 4.
38. Id. at 3; LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 1.01;.
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and not to independent contractors or other third parties.39 Second,
employers are liable for only those injuries that arise out of and in
the course of employment.40 More importantly, for purposes of this
Article, employees are entitled to compensation for only those
injuries that result in partial or total disability and, thereby, affect
earning power.4 Additionally, benefits are limited to three main
types of economic benefits: lost wages, expenses for medical
treatment, and expenses for rehabilitation services.42 Employees do
not receive benefits to compensate for pain and suffering, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, or other types of noneconomic
losses generally compensable in tort.43 Finally, awards generally are
set at a percentage of the injured employee's average wage up to a
statutorily imposed maximum amount.'
B. The History of Workers' Compensation
1. The Freedom of Contract Regime
Workers' compensation legislation stands as one of the foremost
achievements of the Progressive Era. Prior to the adoption of
workers' compensation legislation, the common law was the primary
avenue of redress available to workers for workplace injuries.
"Freedom of contract" or "free labor" was the defining characteristic
of this system.45 Courts asserted that the terms of the employment
agreement between the worker and employer controlled liability for
workplace injuries." However, the law presumed that under the
terms of that agreement, employees assumed the risk of harm arising
from the natural and ordinary incidences of the workplace, including
the risks associated with the employees' own negligence or the
negligence of a fellow employee.47 The courts reasoned that in
39. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 1.01.
40. See id. § 1.03[1].
41. Id. § 1.03[4].
42. JASPER, supra note 29, at 17.
43. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION, supra note 32, § 1.03[4].
44. See id. § 1.03[5].
45. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 568-69; JOHN FABIAN WITT,
THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 12-13 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack
Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50, 56 (1967).
46. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 568.
47. See id.; wIr, supra note 45, at 13.
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exchange, employees bargained for a rate of compensation that
reflected those attendant risks.48 Consistent with this presumption,
the common law recognized three absolute defenses to claims
brought by employees against their employers for workplace
accidents: (1) the fellow-servant rule, which precluded an injured
worker from recovering if his injuries were caused by the negligence
of a co-worker rather than a superior; (2) contributory negligence;
and (3) assumption of the risk.49 These defenses had the practical
effect of precluding most relief for workplace accidents."
The case of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road Corp."
exemplifies this school of thought. The plaintiff, a railroad engineer,
was injured after a fellow employee left a switch in the wrong
position, causing the plaintiff to run his engine off the track. 2 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied recovery under the
fellow-servant rule. 3  In announcing the fellow-servant rule, the
court explained:
The general rule, resulting from considerations as well of
justice as of policy, is, that he who engages in the
employment of another for the performance of specified
duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself
the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the
performance of such services, and in legal presumption, the
compensation is adjusted accordingly. And we are not
aware of any principle which should except the perils
arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who
are in the same employment. These are perils which the
servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as
effectively guard, as the master. They are perils incident to
48. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 45, at 55.
49. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 569, 573 (finding these defenses so
restrictive that Professor Prosser labeled them alternatively "the 'unholy trinity' of common law
defenses," and the "three wicked sisters of the common law"); Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note
45, at 53 ("The fellow-servant rule was an instrument capable of relieving employers from almost
all the legal consequences of industrial injuries.").
50. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 569. Professor Larson estimates that
as a result of these defenses and the requirement of employer fault, at common law, employees
were without remedies in 83 percent of cases of workplace accidents. See LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION, supra note 32, § 2.03.
51. 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
52. Id. at 50.
53. Id. at 59.
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the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and
provided for in the rate of compensation as any others. 4
The court offered some justification of the fellow-servant rule as
the measure most likely to ensure workplace safety. To this end, the
court observed:
Where several persons are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each
depends much on the care and skill with which each other
shall perform his appropriate duty, each is an observer of
the conduct of the others, can give notice of any
misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty, and leave the
service, if the common employer will not take such
precautions, and employ such agents as the safety of the
whole party may require. By these means, the safety of
each will be much more effectually secured, than could be
done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in
case of loss by the negligence of each other.5
Ultimately, however, the court relied on the primacy of the
implied contract between employer and employee that allocated the
risk of workplace injuries to the employee. 6 The plaintiff argued
that the fellow-servant rule should not apply in his case because he
and the negligent employee were not employed in the same
department or duty.57 Following the court's reasoning quoted above,
the plaintiff reasoned that because he was not employed in the same
department as the negligent employee, he could not exert influence
over the fellow employee to prevent the negligence. 8 Accordingly,
he concluded that the fellow-servant rule should not apply to him. 9
In rejecting the argument, the court relied extensively on the implied
contract between the employer and employee. The court concluded:
Besides, it appears to us, that the argument rests upon an
assumed principle of responsibility which does not exist.
The master, in the case supposed, is not exempt from
liability, because the servant has better means of providing
54. Id. at 57.
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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for his safety, when he is employed in immediate connexion
with those from whose negligence he might suffer; but
because the implied contract of the master does not extend
to indemnify the servant against the negligence of anyone
but himself .... Hence, the separation of the employment
into different departments cannot create that liability, when
it does not arise from express or implied contract... 60
2. The Shift to Risk Allocation
Progressive Era reformers initially accepted the common law as
a system for redress for workplace injuries but challenged the
common law defenses that precluded recovery in legislatures.61 In
response to these challenges, several state legislatures adopted
Employers' Liability Acts that statutorily abrogated the fellow-
servant rule in cases of injuries to railroad employees6 2  and
employees working in other industries.63  Progressive efforts on this
front even had success on a national level. In 1906' and again in
1908,65 Congress enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act.66
The Act statutorily created a cause of action for any railroad
60. Id. at 60-61.
61. WITT, supra note 45, at 67 ("By 1911, twenty-five states had enacted legislation
variously abolishing the fellow-servant rule, modifying the contributory negligence doctrine, and
limiting the assumption of risk rule.").
62. For example, the Georgia legislature passed an employers' liability law in 1856 that
attempted to statutorily abrogate the fellow-servant rule in railroad accidents. Iowa, Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin passed laws abrogating the fellow servant rule
by 1900. ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE 1877-1917, at 371 (1999); see also WITT, supra note 4545, at 67; Richard A. Epstein, The
Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775,
791 n.42 (1982). At least twenty-five states adopted laws abrogating the fellow-servant rule,
instituting comparative negligence or limiting assumption of the risk by 1911. WITT, supra note
45, at 67; Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 45, at 64. Professor Sanders attributes this legislative
success to the political strength of the railroad unions and also to the large number of railroad
accidents and the public visibility of these accidents. SANDERS, supra, at 371-72.
63. SANDERS, supra note 62, at 371-72 ("Nevada overrode the fellow-servant and
contributory-negligence defenses for both mines and railroads, and Colorado had abolished the
fellow-servant loophole for all industries before the turn of the century.").
64. Employers' Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906), invalidated by Howard v. I11.
Cent. R.R. Co. (Employers' Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
65. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). The Supreme Court struck down the initial version of FELA on
the grounds that it covered railroad employees who were not engaged in interstate commerce.
See Employers'Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463.
66. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
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employee injured in a workplace accident. In essence, FELA
abrogated the fellow-servant rule and contributory negligence. Even
with the abrogation of these defenses, however, injured workers still
were required to establish their employers' negligence to recover
compensation for their injuries. Levels of compensation were
determined on an individual basis.67
Eventually, Progressives sought a more sweeping reform of
liability for workplace injuries. In workers' compensation,
Progressives sought a system of mandatory employer-funded
compensation akin to a system of social insurance.68 Workers'
compensation systems removed disputes about liability from the
common law system. In so doing, workers' compensation shifted the
risk of loss for workplace injuries from worker to employer. More
importantly, workers' compensation replaced the common law fault-
based system with a system of strict liability.69  Workers'
compensation rested, in part, on a theory that no party-neither
employer nor employee-was at fault for a certain level of industrial
accidents but rather such accidents were inherent hazards of
industry.7" In part, workers' compensation also rested on the theory
that employers should bear the cost of industrial accidents because
they were in the best position to minimize the number of workplace
accidents.71 Finally, workers' compensation rested on a recognition
of the need for compensation and a realization of the social and
economic costs of workplace accidents.72 Indeed, most historians
and legal scholars agree that a significant increase in the number of
deaths and injuries arising out of industrial accidents at the end of the
nineteenth century helped crystallize public attention on the need to
compensate injured workers.73
The Progressives' efforts at reform were overwhelmingly
successful. As a result of Progressive lobbying and campaigning,
almost all states enacted workers' compensation statutes. Indeed,
67. SANDERS, supra note 62, at 371 ("In the private sector, employers' liability statutes left
recovery for injuries or death to the vicissitudes of the legal process.").
68. WIT-r, supra note 45, at 126-27.
69. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 573-74.
70. WrIT, supra note 45, at 143.
71. Id. at 145.
72. See id. at 39 ("Free labor's efficiency was called into question by the enormous waste of
labor power associated with employee injuries.").
73. See, e.g., id. at 24.
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forty-two of the then forty-eight states adopted workers'
compensation laws by 1920. 74 One study estimated that 67.4 percent
of all those gainfully employed were covered by workers'
compensation in 1920."5 By 1963 all states had enacted workers'
compensation legislation.7 6 Between 1960 and 1980 the percentage
of covered employees rose from 80 percent to 87 percent.77
C. Coverage for Psychological Injuries
1. Psychological Injuries Accompanied by
Physical Injuries
Much as it does in tort law, physical injury serves as a magic
key, unlocking the door to workers' compensation coverage for
injured workers. All states extend workers' compensation coverage
to some degree of psychological injuries related to physical injuries
sustained in the course of employment. Some states limit recovery
for psychological injuries to only those injuries that are directly
caused by the physical injury. 79 However, many states define the
requisite relationship between physical and psychological injuries
more broadly. For example, many states extend coverage to all
psychological injuries as long as the injured worker can demonstrate
that the physical injury was a "contributing cause" of the worker's
psychological injury.8" Other states, including Ohio, require merely
that the psychological injury "accompany" a physical injury. 1
74. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 2.08.
75. Id. § 2.08.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 56.03[1].
79. See, e.g., Ruse v. Sedgwick County, 708 P.2d 216, 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (indicating
mental injury benefits recovery depends on showing that the mental injury is directly traceable to
a proven physical injury); Castner v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 415 N.W.2d 873, 873 (Minn. 1987)
(stating that for mental injury to be recoverable, it must be caused by a compensable physical
injury rather than the claimant's work environment).
80. See, e.g., Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Riles, 903 So. 2d 118, 123 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)
(holding that an employee who suffered minor injuries in a deadly mine explosion was entitled to
workers' compensation benefits for PTSD); City of Tampa v. Tingler, 397 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a police officer's minor job-related injury was sufficient to
sustain recovery for PTSD); Boeing Co. v. Viltrakis, 829 P.2d 738, 740 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that a claimant need only show that the compensable physical injury is a "material
contributing cause" of the psychological injury to receive benefits for the psychological injury).
81. See, e.g., Shivel v. Wexford Health Sources, 66 P.3d 414, 415-16 (Okla. 2003) (holding
that a health care worker who was stabbed by an inmate was entitled to recover benefits for her
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Similarly, some states require only that the psychological injury stem
from the same accident as the physical injury. 2
Thus, when Justice Pfeifer noted in his dissent that McCrone
would have received full recovery for her PTSD had she suffered so
much as a paper cut during the holdup, his observation would be
correct in a significant number of jurisdictions, including Ohio. 3
However, even had she sustained a paper cut or other such physical
injury, she still may have been denied coverage in some states. The
cause of her PTSD would be the robbery itself rather than any paper
cut or other injury she sustained during the robbery. Thus, in states
requiring that the physical injury be the cause or a contributing cause
of the psychological injury, McCrone would still be denied coverage.
Regardless of whether McCrone suffered a physical injury such
as a paper cut and regardless of whether that injury was a cause of
her PTSD, of course, the fact that McCrone suffered a real and
serious injury in the form of her PTSD would be the same.
Likewise, regardless of whether she suffered a physical injury, PTSD
would expose her to the same types of potential harms. Sufferers of
PTSD, whether accompanied by a physical injury or not, often
experience sleep disturbances as well as irritability. 4 Sufferers also
may experience physical manifestations such as headaches,
dizziness, chest pain, and gastrointestinal distress.85 Further, under
either scenario the cause of McCrone's PTSD would be the robbery
itself rather than any paper cut or other injury she sustained during
the robbery. Nonetheless, in a significant number of states, the
minor injury would unlock the door to workers' compensation
coverage to compensate her for the medical care she needed to treat
psychological injuries, even though the attack itself rather than the physical injuries to her back,
clavicle and neck caused her psychological injuries, because the Oklahoma workers'
compensation act required only that a physical injury "accompany" a psychological injury).
82. See, e.g., Ducharme v. Garland Belongia, 544 So. 2d 590, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(allowing recovery for PTSD because the driver suffered a physical injury and PTSD as a direct
result of a traffic accident).
83. McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St. 3d 272, 2005 Ohio 6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at
55 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
84. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 463-64 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM] (describing diagnostic criteria for
PTSD, including "persistent symptoms of increased arousal," "difficulty falling asleep or staying
asleep," and "irritability or outbursts of anger").
85. See id.
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her PTSD and for the economic losses she suffered as a result of her
disability.
2. Coverage for "Mental/Mental" Injuries
When a worker suffers solely psychological injuries in the
course of her employment such as McCrone actually did, access to
workers' compensation coverage becomes less certain. The majority
of states now extend workers' compensation coverage to at least
some portion of mental injuries or disabilities sustained in the course
of employment. However, a significant minority of states continue
to exclude all mental injuries from coverage in the absence of an
accompanying physical injury.86 Further, some states insist on a
physical stimulus or physical impact before allowing recovery for
psychological injuries." Thus, only a few states allow recovery for
what Professor Arthur Lawson termed "mental/mental injuries"-
purely mental injuries arising from a purely mental stimulus such as
work stress.88
Even among those states that extend coverage to mental/mental
injuries, recovery is restricted in several ways in which recovery for
physical injuries is not. Some states restrict recovery to only those
psychological injuries caused by a sudden event or stimulus such as
the robbery in McCrone.s9 A significant number of states deny
86. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-113(a)(1) (2002) ("Mental injury or illness is not a
compensable injury unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee's body."); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-275(16)(B) (West 2003) ("'Personal injury' or 'injury' shall not be construed to
include ... (ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such impairment arises from a physical
injury or occupational disease."); City of Holmes Beach v. Grace, 598 So. 2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1992)
("For a mental or nervous injury to be compensable in Florida, there must have been a physical
injury."); Columbus Fire Dept. v. Ledford, 523 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding no
recovery for PTSD in the absence of physical injury); McCrone, 107 Ohio St. 3d 272, 29
("Psychological or psychiatric conditions, without an accompanying physical injury or
occupational disease, are not compensable under [the Workers' Compensation Act].").
87. See, e.g., Jensen v. N.M. State Police, 788 P.2d 382, 385 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that the legislative intent of the workers' compensation act is to limit recovery to injuries caused
by a sudden emotion-provoking event); Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 415 S.E.2d 596,
598 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a strictly psychological injury must be "causally related to
physical injury or be causally related to obvious sudden shock or fright arising in the course of
employment" to be compensable); Boeing Co. v. Key, 5 P.3d 16, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("A
worker may not receive benefits for a mental disability caused by stress resulting from
relationships with supervisors, co-workers or the public, unless she has a mental disability caused
by stress which is the result of exposure to a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature
and producing an immediate and prompt result.").
88. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 56.04.
89. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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recovery for stress-induced psychological injuries unless the injuries
are caused by extraordinary or unusual stress. These states define
extraordinary or unusual stress as stress that is of a greater magnitude
than the stress experienced by other workers employed in the similar
type of employment or experienced by workers in the workplace in
general.9" In other states, where gradual stress results in a physical
injury, workers are required to establish that the workplace stress
was greater than the stress of daily life.9  Others impose a
heightened standard of causation or proof, or require specific types
of expert testimony. For example, a few states deny recovery unless
work stress or stimuli are a predominant cause of the injury.9 2 Others
require the worker to prove injury or causation by clear and
convincing evidence.93 Still other states extend recovery to only
those conditions recognized by the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
or require expert testimony to establish the condition.94
90. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120(8) (2008) (noting that a mental injury that results
from work-related stress "does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is
demonstrated that the stress is work-related and was extraordinary and unusual"); Dunlavey v.
Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 855 (Iowa 1995) (noting that a mental injury arises out
of the course of employment when the injury is "caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude
than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in the same or similar
jobs, regardless of their employer"); Bedini v. Frost, 678 A.2d 893, 894 (Vt. 1996) (noting that a
psychological injury is compensable if "the stresses at work were of a significantly greater
dimension than the daily stresses encountered by all employees").
91. ME. REV. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 201(3) (2001); MO. REv. STAT. § 287.120(8) (2008); OR.
REV. STAT. § 656.802(3)(a) (2008).
92. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(b)(1) (West 2003) ("An employee shall demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all
causes combined of the psychiatric injury."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 201(3) (2001) ("Mental
injury resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course of employment
unless it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that: A. The work stress was
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to pressures and tensions experienced by the average
employee; and B. The work stress, and not some other source of stress, was the predominant
cause of the mental injury."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-402(2)(a) (2008) ("Legal causation
requires proof of extraordinary mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising predominantly and
directly from employment.").
93. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.802(3)(d) (2007) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence that the mental disorder arose out of and in the course of employment); Traweek v. City
of W. Monroe, 713 So. 2d 655, 660 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that a clear and convincing
standard is a heavier burden of proof than the usual civil case of preponderance of the evidence).
94. Traweek, 713 So. 2d at 660 (noting that for mental injury to be compensable, it must be
diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis must meet the most current
criteria in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders).
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III. THE PUZZLING VITALITY OF THE PHYSICAL IMPACT RULE
A. The Physical Impact Rule and
the Myth of Certainty
Courts and legislatures offer two primary reasons for restricting
coverage of mental injuries. First, as in tort law, courts and
legislatures express concern that psychological injuries are more
difficult to diagnose than physical injuries and hence that limitations
on such claims are necessary to reduce the incidence of fraudulent
claims. For example, in Bedini v. Frost,95 the Vermont Supreme
Court imposed a heightened standard of proof on workers seeking
benefits for psychological injuries even though the express language
of the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act did not appear to
impose such a requirement.96 The court concluded that such a
heightened standard was reasonable because of the greater
uncertainty in the diagnosis of such injuries.97  Likewise, in
McCrone,98 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the provisions in the
Ohio Workers' Compensation Act allowing recovery for
psychological injuries if accompanied by physical injuries but
precluding recovery for solely psychological injuries.99 In so doing,
the court accepted arguments by the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation that it reasonably treated the two types of claims
differently because mental injuries are often difficult to prove.' The
court noted that "[a]lthough a physical injury may or may not cause a
psychological or psychiatric condition, it may furnish some proof of
a legitimate mental claim."''
Whatever sway this argument may have once held seems
diminished by the significant advancements in the diagnosis and
treatment of psychological injuries made over the past thirty years.
At least since the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual Third Edition ("DSM") in 1980, the American Psychiatric
Association has recognized explicit diagnostic criteria for a wide
95. 678 A.2d 893 (Vt. 1996).
96. Id. at 894-95.
97. Id. at 895.
98. 107 Ohio St. 3d 272, 2005 Ohio 6505, 839 N.E.2d 1.
99. Id. 36.
100. Id. 33.
101. Id.
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array of mental disorders such as those experienced by injured
workers in the workplace. 1 2  The publication of these diagnostic
criteria, in turn, has generated extensive empirical research on the
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders."3 The diagnostic
criteria have been revised with the publication of DSM Fourth
Edition ("DSM-IV"). In the preparation of DSM-IV, the criteria were
developed and validated through extensive review of empirical
literature and extensive field trials. For example, in preparing the
DSM-IV, work groups performed extensive review of existing
empirical literature, in part to ensure the reliability of diagnostic
criteria."°  The work groups also conducted twelve field trials of
more than 6,000 subjects from more than seventy sites to test the
reliability of each set of diagnostic criteria.0 5 Additionally, mental
health professionals have developed and validated standardized
interview questionnaires. For example, studies have demonstrated
the reliability of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview.
1 6
Moreover, an extensive body of research has chronicled the link
between exposure to workplace stress and physical and mental
health. "7
To be sure, the existence of diagnostic criteria and even
standardized interview criteria does not ensure certainty or even
unanimity of diagnosis. Different experts can reach different
diagnoses of the same claimant. However, the difficulties and
uncertainties involved in diagnosing psychological injuries seem no
greater than the difficulties associated with diagnosing some physical
injuries. For example, claims regarding lower-back pain have
generated conflicting diagnoses both as to their existence and their
cause.10 8  Nonetheless, legislatures and courts have continued to
102. See DSM, supra note 84, at xviii.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at xix.
106. Susan L. Ettner, Richard G. Frank & Ronald C. Kessler, The Impact of Psychiatric
Disorders on Labor Market Outcomes, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64, 66 (1997).
107. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22.
108. See, e.g., Roberts v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n., 222 S.W.3d 322, 334 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (indicating conflicting expert testimony as to whether claimant suffered a herniated
disc and conflicting testimony as to whether the herniated disc was caused by a work-related
accident rather than personal activities); Patterson v. Wal-Mart Assocs., No. CA 06-1245, 2007
WL 1429815, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. May 16, 2007) (indicating conflicting testimony about
whether claimant's back pain was caused by work accident or preexisting condition).
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extend coverage for such physical injuries subject only to the
requirement that the worker offer sufficient proof to establish the
injury.
Perhaps the more nuanced objection is not that the existence of
psychological injuries or disorders is difficult to diagnose with
certainty, but that it is difficult to determine whether and to what
degree work-related stress contributed to psychological injuries
rather than some other stressor. °9 This problem appears to be
particularly apparent with respect to psychological injuries caused by
gradual work stress rather than by sudden traumatic events. Some
limitations placed on recovery for stress-induced injuries may gain
traction in light of this objection. However, this hardly seems to be a
basis to deny all claims for psychological injuries.
States have grappled with these types of difficult causation
issues in the context of physical injury as well as psychological
injury. Most notably, two types of physical conditions have raised
these same types of causation problems: (1) generalized medical
conditions, such as cardiac events or injuries and back injuries other
than a herniated disc; and (2) generalized diseases such as
pneumonia, arthritis, colitis, or tuberculosis. As Professor Larson
has noted in his influential treatise, a few states have limited
recovery for these types of physical conditions to cases in which a
worker shows that her injury was caused by an unusual exertion
outside the scope of her ordinary and usual duties.1 ' One reason for
imposing this limitation in such cases may be a concern that these
types of cases pose the most difficult causation problems.
Generalized medical conditions such as these can be caused by a
number of factors or stressors other than workplace activities. The
unusual-exertion rule may be an attempt to exclude those cases
where external stressors caused the worker's injury. Indeed, in
109. See Bedini, 678 A.2d at 894 (Vt. 1996); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, 107 Ohio St.
3d 272, 2005 Ohio 6505, 839 N.E.2d I (arguing that the Ohio General Assembly rationally
excluded "purely psychological claims" because "proof problems with purely psychological
injuries are enormous. When is a headache work-induced as opposed to idiopathic in nature?");
STRESS... AT WORK, supra note 16 (recognizing different schools of thought about the role of
the individual worker's characteristics in contributing to job stress but favoring the view that
working conditions play a primary role while individual and situational factors may intensify the
effect of stressful working conditions).
110. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, §43.01.
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limiting the unusual-exertion rule to heart cases, the Washington
Supreme Court offered just such a justification.
The fundamental differences between heart attacks and
back injuries are such as to render the "unusual exertion"
test irrelevant when transplanted into the area of the law
dealing with injuries to the skeletal structure of the body, in
particular the back. A heart attack, under current
persuasive medical theory, is largely related to long-term
disease, and may be unrelated to the particular employment
hazard to which the worker may be subjected. Thus, the
thought that a heart attack suffered during accustomed
exertion is really happenstance as to time and place is
exemplified in the approach of the majority in Windhurst.
Contrast this to injuries of the back. It is quite possible that
a light or usual strain applied at an unusually different angle
could, through the forces of levers, et cetera, overpower and
injure a normal back.'1'
A requirement that an injured worker demonstrate that her
injuries were caused by extraordinary or unusual stress, likewise,
may be an attempt at grappling with the difficult causation issues
associated with stress-induced injuries. However, as Professor
Larson has explained, the majority of states have not imposed any
unusual exertion requirement and allow recovery for physical
injuries caused by usual as well as unusual exertions."2 Moreover, in
contrast to the treatment of mental/mental injuries, no state has
sought to preclude all recovery for these types of generalized medical
conditions." 3
B. The Physical Impact Rule as a Dam
As they do in denying tort coverage to purely emotional injuries,
courts and legislatures also express concern that extending workers'
compensation coverage to mental/mental injuries will open the
floodgates to a limitless number of claims and impose too great a
financial burden on employers." 4  Some notion that claims for
11. Boeing Co. v. Fine, 396 P.2d 145, 147 (Wash. 1964).
112. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 43.01.
113. Id.
114. See McCrone, 107 Ohio St. 3d 272, 35 ("It cannot be said that denying workers'
compensation benefits to claimants who simply allege mental disorders or emotional stress due to
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psychological injuries are somehow susceptible to fraud or
exaggeration seems implicit in this objection.
Coverage for psychological injuries would significantly increase
an employer's liability under one of a few scenarios. First,. extending
coverage to such claims would increase the employer's liability if
workers suffer psychological injuries at a significantly greater rate
than physical injuries. Second, extending coverage to such claims
would increase costs if such claims were more costly because they
were more likely to result in greater disability or because the cost to
treat such claims was more expensive. To this end, note that
objections such as those raised in response to traditional tort claims,
such as objections that damages for emotional distress and similar
injuries are difficult to quantify and thus subject to large and
unpredictable awards, would not be relevant to claims for workers'
compensation for psychological injuries. Recall that even in the
context of psychological injury, workers' compensation awards
benefits for economic losses only, such as lost wages as a result of
inability to work and expenses incurred in medical treatment of the
injury. "5 Thus, extending coverage to claims for psychological
injuries would increase costs only if such injuries resulted in greater
disability and hence greater lost wages, or only if the economic costs
associated with treatment of these conditions were greater than the
costs associated with treatment of physical conditions. Even if any
of these assumptions were correct, they would seem poor reasons to
exclude coverage. This is particularly true in light of the fact that
employer-provided health insurance usually provides lower levels of
coverage for mental illness and disorders than it provides for
physical injuries and conditions. " 6 Moreover, it would not explain
concerns over psychological claims as opposed to other frequently
occurring physical injuries or other costly physical injury claims.
Thus, the concern about a large number of claims seems to be
motivated, in part, by a suspicion that these claims are susceptible to
fabrication or an unwillingness to accept that these claims require
treatment or affect workplace productivity. As discussed above,
their jobs is irrational, particularly when the requirement of a physical injury enables the state to
distribute the limited resources of the fund to disabilities determined by the state to be covered.").
115. LARSON'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 32, § 1.01.
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND PARITY ACT: DESPITE NEW
FEDERAL STANDARDS, MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS REMAIN LIMITED 2 (May 2000).
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however, advancements in the diagnosis of psychological injuries
alleviate much of the concern about fraudulent claims." 7 Recent
social science research belies any claim that psychological injuries
do not affect workplace productivity.
Moreover, just as doctrines such as the zone-of-danger doctrine
seek to limit the scope of plaintiffs to whom the defendant owes a
duty as a way to limit the defendant's potential liability, workers'
compensation schemes contain other devices designed to limit the
scope of claimants for whose injuries employers are liable. Workers'
compensation schemes extend recovery to employees only and cover
only those injuries that arise in the course of employment. More
importantly, employees are eligible for workers' compensation
benefits only upon a showing of partial or total vocational disability.
Such limitations would seem to alleviate concerns about claims
arising from general work dissatisfaction. Thus, unlike the situation
posed in tort law, employers do not face limitless liability in the
absence of exclusion of coverage for purely psychological injuries.
Further, arguments that psychological injuries are not foreseeable
risks of workplace stressors seem misplaced as the body of research
detailing the link between workplace stress and mental and physical
health grows.
IV. A RETURN TO THE OFFICE
Under the current status of the law, workers are presumed at a
minimum to assume the risk of psychological injuries resulting from
the ordinary and usual level of stress in the workplace." 8 In states
with even greater limitations on recovery, for psychological injuries,
workers like Kimberly McCrone assume the risk of psychological
injuries arising from even unusual workplace events." 9 In contrast,
under workers' compensation schemes, workers assume virtually
none of the risk of physical injury in the workplace-even the risk of
injury arising from usual or ordinary events. Indeed, the
fundamental premise of workers' compensation was to shift the risk
of loss from ordinary workplace perils from the worker to the
117. DSM, supra note 84.
118. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 39-A, § 201(3) (2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120(8)
(2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(3)(a) (2008).
119. See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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employee. 12' The burden on the worker resulting from this
distinction is heightened by the relatively lower level of coverage
employer-provided health insurance provides for mental illness and
disorders. 2'
Why then have so many states been reluctant to apply the
underlying risk allocation of workers' compensation to psychological
injuries? I suspect that the answer lies in the episode of The Office
detailed above. Public perception refuses to view mental illnesses
and psychological disorders as "real" and serious health risks and
continues to discount the negative impact that workplace stress has
on mental health and well being. As much as early thinking about
industrial accidents placed blame with the injured worker for
workplace injuries, a perception continues that sufferers of
psychological disorders are responsible for their own conditions and,
hence, are not worthy of compensation.' These perceptions persist
despite a growing base of social science research establishing and
quantifying the risks of exposure to workplace stress. For example,
in one recent study, the World Health Organization estimated that by
2020 depression and anxiety disorders, including stress-related
disorders, will be second only to ischemic heart disease in the scope
of disabilities experienced by sufferers.'23 Likewise, researchers
have quantified the cost in lost workplace productivity of anxiety
disorders.1
24
Most historians and legal scholars have concluded that a
significant increase in the number of deaths and injuries arising out
of industrial accidents at the end of the nineteenth century helped
focus public attention on the problem of workplace accidents and
120. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, at 573.
121. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 116, at 2.
122. For example, in distinguishing McCrone's claim of PTSD from other potential claims for
psychological injuries, Justice Pfeifer remarked, "We are not dealing in these cases with a person
claiming depression because she is bored with her job and really wants to be an actress. This
case, Bunger, and Bailey all present instances in which the psychological injuries were
demonstrably tied to a specific traumatic, accidental event in the workplace. They do not present
the same issues of proof as "I hate my job"-type depression masquerading as a workers'
compensation claim. Allowing benefits in this case does not mean across-the-board
compensation for all claims of mental illness. Allowing benefits in this case allows for equal
treatment of people with the same, equally provable injuries." McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107
Ohio St. 3d 272, 2005 Ohio 6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at 56 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
123. Madhu Kalia, Assessing the Economic Impact of Stress-The Modern Day Hidden
Epidemic, 51 METABOLISM 49, 49 (2002).
124. Id. at 50.
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helped crystallize support for a no-fault system to compensate
injured workers. 125 Indeed, historians and legal scholars refer to an
"industrial accident crisis" that precipitated the workers'
compensation resolution.126 As evidence about the rising level of
workplace stress and the negative impact such stress has on our
health and well-being as well as our economic productivity begins to
mount, perhaps public attention will begin to focus on this new
industrial accident crisis.
125. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 45, at 60.
126. See JASPER, supra note 29, at 1; WITT, supra note 45, at 38-39
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